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After the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami, much of the world's effort to defend against tsunami concentrated
on tsunami warning and evacuation. The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami led to direct and
indirect losses as well as the deaths of many vulnerable members of Japan's coastal communities. This
event has resulted in Japan rethinking and revising its design codes for sea defence structures. The new
guidance emerging from this process is a valuable resource for other countries re-evaluating their own
current mitigation strategies and this paper presents details of this process. The paper starts with the
history of sea defence design standards in Japan and explains the process of revision of design guidelines
since 2011. Examples of sea defences that failed and have since been rebuilt, observed during the two
Earthquake Engineering Field Investigation Team (EEFIT) missions of 2011 and 2013, are also presented.
The paper concludes with a discussion of international approaches and their application to nuclear
power stations in Japan and the UK.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
In 2011 Japan was considered to be the best prepared nation on
earth to withstand a large tsunami attack on its coasts, with sea
defence structures (breakwaters, sea dikes and seawalls) specifi-
cally designed to afford sufficient protection to coastal settlements
and critical infrastructure. Massive detached breakwaters were
built in bays to defend great industrial ports and their populations;
sea dikes were constructed along much of the coastal plain areas
to protect low-lying agricultural land and towns from both tsu-
namis and storm surges; and seawalls, some of which were 10 m
or more in height, were built as a result of previous tsunamis to
provide protection for busy settlements. However, the size of the
waves generated by the unexpectedly large magnitude of the 2011
Great East Japan Earthquake (Moment Magnitude 9) led to sea
defences and other coastal structures being overwhelmed and in
many cases completely or partially destroyed. Overtopping of the
sea protection wall at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station
led to the loss of seawater pump facilities for the reactor coolingr Ltd. This is an open access article
Raby),
setto@ucl.ac.uk (T. Rossetto).water causing a major release of radioactive material.
Due to the non-structural measures in place along Japan's
vulnerable coastlines i.e. comprehensive warning systems and
well-rehearsed evacuation plans, casualty figures were relatively
low in comparison to the levels of devastation caused by the
tsunami. However, this paper focuses on the structural measures
to defend against tsunamis (though not the seismic considera-
tions, see e.g. [46]) and charts the evolution of Japanese design
guidelines and standards in the light of this catastrophic event. It
describes the research that has been conducted into the failure
mechanisms of key sea defence structures, explains the different
levels to which sea defence structures must now be built and
describes the detailed disaster scenario document that now exists
for design considerations. Photographs and observations from two
Earthquake Engineering Field Investigation Team (EEFIT) missions
to Japan are included to illustrate the damage caused to defences
and the reconstruction that has subsequently taken place in some
locations. The paper then presents an overview of international
approaches to sea defence design, where they exist, including the
new American Society of Civil Engineers standard. It concludes by
providing details of post-2011 sea defence structures built to
protect an existing Japanese nuclear power station at Hamaoka,
and the new Hinkley Point C power station in the UK.under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Notation
The following symbols are used in this paper:
aI incident tsunami height;
g gravitational acceleration;
pu uplift pressure;
p1 maximum value of pressure;
η* effective tsunami height; and
ρ0 density of seawater.
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Before discussing Japanese guidance the terminology used to
define such structures is given in Fig. 1. The underlined termi-
nology is that which is used in this paper.
Japan has a rich history of guidance available to coastal en-
gineers for the design of sea defence structures. In addition to the
internationally renowned Yoshimi Goda who produced three
editions of his book on the design of such structures over a nearly
30 year period [24] there are official Technical Standards that have
been established under government acts. These prescribe the re-
quired technical criteria that should be applied in the construction,
renovation or maintenance of facilities [65]. Manuals are also
published as reference documents that provide detailed design
guidance. The standards and manuals available for ports and
harbour facilities prior to 2011 are shown in Fig. 2 and explained
as follows.
The Technical Standards comprise a brief summary of each
standard with an accompanying commentary which is divided
into written notes on the standard followed by reference in-
formation with pertinent equations [65]; this information may be
in the form of academic articles, design manuals, technical notes
etc. The standards are prepared by bureaus within the respective
ministries. Revisions to standards are introduced when there haveScTerminology
Breakwater (generic)
Coastal levee [33] /
Dike [38] /
Reveted embankment [59] /
Revetment [59] /
Sea dike [5]
Breast wall [38] /
Seawall [53]
Fig. 1. Sea defence structure tebeen major changes e.g. the Technical Standards for Port and
Harbour Facilities, moved from designing for regular to irregular
waves in 1978 or the incorporation of performance-based design
in 2007 (following pressure from the Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement [51]).
The production of the 2007 edition of the Port and Harbour
Facilities technical standards was a collaboration involving:
 the Ports and Harbours Bureau (PHB) of the Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT);
 the National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management
(NILIM) of the MLIT; and
 the Port and Airport Research Institute (PARI).
An English translation of these 2007 technical standards was
released by the Overseas Coastal Area Development Institute of
Japan in 2009; this translation will be the document referred to in
this paper as PHB [51].
The last Design Manual was released in 2000 [7]. This was
prepared by the Committee on Coastal Engineering of the Japanese
Society of Civil Engineering, a neutral body that had representa-
tion across different Ministries and from academics and practicing
engineers (Mizuguchi and Iwata, 1999).
The design process in Japan might typically involve a nationalhematic diagram of structure section
quay wall
quay wall
rminology [5,33,38,53,59].
Fig. 2. Official Japanese guidance available prior to 2011.
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engineers in the private sector. The designs are then examined
according to the standards by the relevant Bureau. Prefectures
generally use ministry Standards and Manuals rather than devel-
oping their own and budgets from the ministries, prefectures, and
big cities like Kobe and Yokohama (which have their own har-
bours), far outweigh those of the private sectors [34].
The 2007 Technical Standard for Port and Harbour Facilities
[51] contains extensive guidance on the design of sea defence
structures subject to tsunami. On the size of the tsunami, the
standard requires that this should be determined by either nu-
merical analysis or on the basis of historical tsunami, with the
larger value selected [62]. This approach is in sharp contrast to
what was done in the 20th century where structural design had
apparently been based upon tsunami magnitudes experienced in
the preceding decades.
As an example of the detail that is included in the standards,
Fig. 3 illustrates the theoretical tsunami force and distribution of
pressures on a caisson breakwater. These breakwaters are some-
times built specifically for defending a port from tsunami.
The effective height used for the calculation of pressures is
given by
a3.0 1Iη* = ( )
where η* is the effective tsunami height and aI is the incident
tsunami height.
Pressure values increase linearly as shown in Fig. 3 to a max-
imum value of
p ga2.2 2I 0 Iρ= ( )
where ρ0g is the unit weight of seawater.
The uplift pressure at the base of the front surface is given by
p p 3u I= ( )Fig. 3. Tsunami wave load distribution on vertical wall based upon Fig. 5.2 of PHB
[51].The performance verification of tsunami breakwaters requires
an examination of stability against sliding and overturning of the
upright section, and failure due to insufficient bearing capacity of
the foundation. Consideration must also be given to the effect of
the tsunami on water levels, recommending that numerical si-
mulations are undertaken to evaluate the water level inside and
outside of the breakwater, warning that the inside water level may
not be the still water level. Further, it recommends the use of
hydraulic model tests to deduce the tsunami force as the current
theoretical understanding is not adequate.
For sea dikes it is necessary to look at the Technical Standards
and Commentaries of Coastal Protection Facilities (though there is
no English translation). Regarding seawalls, those structures which
are required to defend against tsunami should have dimensions
appropriate to perform this function according to the 2007 Tech-
nical Standards [51]. They are also to retain their structural stabi-
lity even if the function of the seawall, e.g. ability to resist over-
topping, is exceeded.3. Field observations following the 2011 tsunami
The first of the two EEFIT missions to Japan took place 11 weeks
after the 11 March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, following repair
of the train line through the affected region. Within the team
various civil engineering disciplines were represented including
coastal engineers. Japan's reputation for coastal engineering is
unrivalled: between 1965 and 1985 they constructed more than
1300 breakwaters [60] and they had also provided training to
tsunami-prone countries following the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami
under the auspices of UNESCO (ICHARM) [58]. It was therefore
important to visit the country to see how the structures had per-
formed. Visual observations of a variety of sea defence structures
were undertaken and comprehensive details are provided in the
EEFIT reports [17,18] and by Fraser et al. [23]. Fig. 4 indicates the
key observation locations in the Tohoku region.
Some 8500 m of breakwaters failed during the 2011 event [53]
including dedicated tsunami breakwaters like the World record
breakwater at Kamaishi. Whilst barely visible from the town its
destruction is worth reporting here. Comprising two sections, one
of 670 m length and the other 770 m length it was built in a
maximum water depth of 63 m. A cross-section is shown in Fig. 5.
The failure of the breakwater has been subject to physical and
numerical modelling investigations carried out by the Port and
Airport Research Institute (PARI). They concluded that the struc-
ture failed due to a combination of two effects caused by the
tsunami overflow: water level difference between the two sides of
the breakwater causing an increase in the lateral force and the
overflow scouring causing a reduction in friction between the
caisson and mound leading to sliding [1].
Fig. 4. Outline map of the EEFIT observation region, indicating locations of key
coastal structures.
Fig. 6. Concrete debris from breakwater and seawalls offshore of Tarō, captured
during the 2011 EEFIT mission.
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graphed in the bay at Tarō, amongst which were parts of a
breakwater, as evidenced by the inclined harbour light.
The sea dikes shown in Fig. 7 showed clear effects of scour on
the lee side leading to cracking of insufficiently-reinforced con-
crete lattice work.
Seawall failures of both gravity seawalls and compacted sand
core structures were also observed (Fig. 8). Failure mechanisms of
the Tarō seawall included the removal of rear slope protection
blocks due to the tsunami overflow, the collapse of the crest
parapet due to impulsive fluid forces, the collapse of the front
protection blocks due to draw-down and there was also evidence
of shear failure between blocks [29].4. Updates to Japanese Tsunami Design Procedures post-2011
4.1. Tsunami classifications
One of the key criticisms of the sea defence structures was thatFig. 5. Cross-section through the Kamaishithey were not designed for a tsunami of the magnitude experi-
enced in 2011 [3]. Design water levels were based upon tsunamis
from fairly recent history e.g. the Meiji Sanriku tsunami of 1896,
which caused a significant number of casualties (around 22,000
deaths) but had smaller recorded run-up levels than the 2011
tsunami [19]. The issue of inadequate design water levels has been
addressed following negotiations between the government and
disaster management experts post-2011 and Japan now has a two
level description of tsunami hazard [61]. The levels are defined
purely according to their return period at a particular location.
Level 1 tsunamis are those that occur every ‘50–60 to 150–160
years’ and Level 2 events occurring every few hundred to few
thousand years [61]. Estimations of the inundation level are ob-
tained from a combination of historic tsunami levels and numer-
ical modelling of past and potential future tsunamigenic earth-
quakes. It has been decided that all sea defences should prevent
inundation against a Level 1 event. However, whilst they should
resist immediate structural failure for larger events [2] they should
not be designed to stop overtopping as it would not be econom-
ically feasible. Incidentally, PIANC (World Association for Water-
borne Transport Infrastructure) have a working group addressing
Mitigation of Tsunami Disasters in Ports and they advise that re-
inforcements that would enable structures to withstand Level
2 events are an important measure in tsunami resilience: if a
structure can survive, albeit in a damaged state, it will still afford a
level of protection [54]. However, despite the hard engineering
solutions that might be implemented, Level 2 events principally
require non-structural measures to ensure life-safety e.g. warnings
and evacuation procedures that were found to be effective in the
2011 event [17]. The latter measures also play an essential role for
protection against Level 1 events in what is described as “In-
tegrated Protection” i.e. both structural and non-structural mea-
sures for tsunami-resilient cities [36].South breakwater (based on Ref. [40]).
Fig. 7. Damage to Yamamoto sea dikes observed during the 2011 EEFIT mission: (a) exposed sand core on the lee side; (b) evidence of sand core having been washed out;
(c) exposed section through the sea dike; and (d) remnants of the dike into the distance, lying in pools of seawater to the lee side of the structure having not subsequently
drained away.
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Following the 2011 event and after the human recovery phase
there was a great deal of activity by coastal engineers in site sur-
veying and conducting laboratory and numerical modelling of the
failed coastal structures. Some work was carried out within gov-
ernment organisations and some by researchers in universities.
Much work was undertaken on failure mechanisms as reported in
PIANC [54] and research literature (e.g. [1,33,31]).
Outputs from these efforts have been reflected in revisions to
the technical standards, manuals and guidelines. As mentioned
earlier, these exist to inform Japanese engineers of the most ap-
propriate design for a facility. Fig. 9 shows the evolution of these
documents following the 2011 event.
As mentioned previously, prior to 2011 there existed Technical
Standards prepared by the Port and Harbour Bureau of the Min-
istry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport [51] and the Committee
on Coastal Engineering Design Manual [7]. Following the 2011
event the publication: A Draught Manual for Developing Earth-
quake-Tsunami Disaster Scenarios including Damage to Public Works
[43] was produced as an ‘urgent action' by NILIM for MLIT, col-
lecting together knowledge of tsunami forces.
In parallel with this, the Technical Standards document of 2007
was revised in 2014 [52] and incorporates new guidelines in-
cluding the 2013 Guidelines for tsunami-resistant breakwaters,
produced by the PHB, NILIM and PARI. Various official guidelineshave been issued based upon research activity and these have fed
into the revised technical standards. At this time there is no official
English translation of these standards.
Incidentally, the 2000 version of the design manual [7] is now
out of print though is still used by engineers and researchers as it
describes the theoretical reasoning in some detail and was the
original authoritative text for the design parameters [34].
In the following sections aspects of the guidelines, technical
standards, design and prediction manuals pertinent to design for
tsunami defence will be discussed. Many of the texts are still only
available in Japanese; what is presented in the following are
translations obtained as part of the 2013 EEFIT mission.
4.2.1. General requirements
In addition to considering tsunami loads which the structure
must withstand, it is necessary to take into account the earthquake
loads that may have preceded the waves. Effects of both sub-
sidence and liquefaction must also be considered because they
may lead to a reduction in the crest height of the structure. It is the
crest height that determines the extent to which the structure can
resist overtopping [43]. All sea defence structures must be able to
withstand Level 1 seismic motion that typically occurs once or
twice in its lifetime, but those that defend critical infrastructure
need to be designed with larger and less frequent Level 2 events in
mind.
Tsunami loads on structures are to be estimated from
Fig. 8. Seawall damage observed during the 2011 EEFIT Mission: (a) damage to seawall and quay at Minamisanriku; (b) close-up of seawall block at Minamisanriku showing
no interlinkages; (c) recovery work on the seawall at Miyako Bay; and (d) remaining seawall buttress at Tarō.
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and local authorities. If simulations are not possible other appro-
priate methods (undisclosed) are to be used [43].
The NILIM disaster scenario manual [43] recognises that a
tsunami may consist of a number of waves where subsequent
waves could be larger than the first wave. Therefore, tsunami
damage to the sea defence facility may reduce its inundation
prevention capability, and may lead to increased damage to the
land behind the defence due to subsequent tsunami waves. A wide
range of suggested wave pressure distribution sources are pro-
vided in a detailed diagram and in tabular format. The vast ma-
jority of the scientific research that forms the basis is post-2000.
The following considerations were made:
 the location of the structure with respect to the shoreline;
 the orientation of the structure;
 whether soliton breakup is likely i.e. for steep bathymetries the
tsunami waves will split into several short-period waves; and
 whether the wave imparts an impact force to the structure in
addition to the hydro-static load.
The NILIM disaster scenario manual [43] also suggests equa-
tions for the load on top of the structure and on its lee side and for
the return flow loads.
MLIT [37] compares the 2007 and 2014 technical standards and
suggests that the pressure coefficient of Eq. (2) is to be increased
from 2.2 to 3.0 when the tsunami is a bore-type (where theleading edge of the tsunami has broken) i.e. a 36% increase in
predicted force. It should be noted that this factor is still less than
the value of 3.5 given by Ikeno et al. [27] for gently sloping seabeds
where soliton breakup may occur. Finally, there are other con-
ceptual changes in the revised document, referring to tsunamis in
two categories: expected or exceptionally large scale.
4.2.2. Breakwaters
The NILIM disaster scenario manual [43] gives a comprehensive
flow chart illustrating the mechanisms by which a composite
breakwater may fail; this is translated and reproduced in Fig. 10.
The flow chart covers the full range breakwater failure me-
chanisms from the initial effect of the tsunami (e.g. caisson da-
mage due to debris impact and scouring of foundation), the effect
of these initial issues on the positioning of the structure (e.g. tilting
or subsidence) right through to the hydrodynamics (e.g. increase in
flow speed or wave pressure convergence) and ultimately the
failure of the structure. The manual also gives sources of equations
to calculate pressures and necessary masses of armouring stones
such as tetrapods. It is noted that it is not straightforward to cal-
culate the effect of a tsunami on tetrapods.
The Port and Airport Research Institute (PARI) contributed to a
document entitled Guideline for Tsunami-Resistant Design of
Breakwaters (a proposal) by MLIT, presenting laboratory tests un-
dertaken in 2012. Photographs of results from hydraulic tests with
different angles of overflow are given in MLIT [39]. The key re-
quirements are to redirect the flow of the overtopping tsunami so
Fig. 9. Evolution of official Japanese design guidelines following the 2011 tsunami.
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extensive protective armouring on the lee side. Fig. 11 shows ori-
ginal and revised designs for a caisson breakwater based on a
NILIM newsletter [44].
As reported in the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science
and Technology in Japan White Paper [35], by March 2016 MLIT is
committed to completing all ‘breakwater recovery work' that will
see the revised crown shapes and lee side armour protection.
Repair of the Kamaishi breakwater was already underway during
the [18] mission.
4.2.3. Sea dikes
The NILIM disaster scenario manual [43] provides a tsunami
loading diagram for sea dikes (Fig. 12). These particular illustra-
tions, which relate to overturning as a design consideration, do not
address scour on the lee side though it is described elsewhere in
the document.
Following the circulation of prevention measures suggested by
the Committee on Tsunami Protection Measures at Coastal Areas,
Suwa et al. [64] indicate that investigative hydraulic experiments
have been undertaken. These have been reported in a NILIM
Technical Flash [42] and published by the Japan Society for Civil
Engineers [32]. These have led to the following important gui-
dance for the design of sea dikes:
 protect the landward toe of the structure from scour by pro-
viding improved foundations of up to 5m wide and 2m deep as
shown in the NILIM document describing the experiments [45];
 avoid unevenness on the landward side of the dike by using
interlocked blocks with notches at their top and bottom edges;
 avoid any single block of the dike being subject to negative
pressure by interlocking all units (including the crown).
These recommendations have been incorporated into the re-
built Sendai Bay dikes [64], immediately adjacent to the interna-
tional airport. The dike is flanked with 2 tonne interconnected
concrete blocks [28]. The [18] mission visited this area and pho-
tographs of the completed dikes near Yuriage are shown in Fig. 13.
At a meeting with the Vice-Mayor of Iwanuma City during the2013 EEFIT mission, he expressed the view that these sea defences
would not last more than 50 years, but the inland barrier of a
string of man-made hills would endure. These so-called Millen-
nium Hope Hills are an example of several lines of defence that are
being implemented; others include raised roadways with inland
lock gates [36].
Fig. 14 shows both newly completed and under construction
sea dikes at Arahama. The crest elevation was approximately 2 m
higher than the pre-tsunami dike, and is assumed to be at the
standard 7.2 m above Tokyo Peil (T.P., the fundamental metric
datum of Japan), providing protection against Level 1 events, ex-
perienced every few decades. The dike armour comprised tessel-
lated pre-cast concrete units. All the elements, even the steps,
were of pre-cast construction. The sections under construction
revealed the rubble/soil core topped by a geotextile membrane, a
new recommendation.
Due to the depth of sand at the time it was not clear from the
Yuriage and Arahama sites the extent of landward toe protection.
Details of the armour units at both locations showed variations
(differently shaped concrete blocks and at Arahama the lifting
holes were grouted whereas at Yuriage they remained unfilled);
the EEFIT team was informed by Mr Shinichi Endo, Director of
Earthquake Disasters of MLIT's Tōhoku office, that whilst the de-
signs were slightly different the contractors used the same
specifications.
4.2.4. Seawalls
According to the NILIM disaster scenario manual [43] tsunami
damage to the seawall can be split into three classifications: wave
force damage, frontal scouring pattern and rear scouring pattern.
Mention is particularly made of scour due to drawdown of the
tsunami. A flow chart, translated and reproduced in Fig. 15 shows
the damage chain to which gravity-based seawall structures are
subjected, with the succession of damage resulting from the three
classifications.
One of the very largest seawalls, in the town of Tarō, failed
spectacularly in places (see Figs. 8(d) and 6), though not at the
oldest sections completed in 1958 which had also proved effective
in the 1960 Chilean tsunami [17]. Ironically the town was
TSUNAMI
BREAKWATER
BREACH
Fig. 10. Correlation of chains of main tsunami damage in caisson composite breakwaters (based on [43]).
Fig. 11. Caisson breakwater section (a) former design (b) recommended design for a
‘strong breakwater' able to resist a tsunami beyond the design height (based upon
[44]).
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earlier disaster due to its protective seawall. Due to the enormous
extent of the destruction and the rapid clearance of this particularsite at the time of the 2011 EEFIT mission, it was not possible to
identify which of the three classifications was dominant though
Ishikawa et al. [29] present very detailed observations and both
numerical and physical modelling results for the case of this sea-
wall collapse, providing a number of suggested collapse mechan-
isms as mentioned in Section 3. The replacement sections of the
wall will crucially have steel reinforcement [30], notably absent
from the previous failed sections (see Fig. 8). During the 2013
EEFIT mission the port of Minamisanriku was re-visited to see
progress on seawall reconstruction, but no change was observed in
the damaged structures (see Fig. 16) though the fishing market had
been rebuilt.5. Design approaches to sea defence structures
5.1. International design experience
Early Japanese design approaches evolved independently of the
international community due to general cultural isolation and the
language barrier. Horikawa [26] estimated that only around 5% to
15% of Japanese Coastal Engineering papers are published in
English. Some of the earliest work on wave loading was conducted
by Hiroi in 1919 and was still in use until Goda produced his work
in the second half of the century [26,65]. During the middle part of
the 20th Century, Japan formalised their design guidelines, in-
corporating some US guidance produced by the US Army Corps of
Engineers in their Shore Protection, Planning and Design guide, an
Fig. 12. Loading diagram of sea dikes (translated from [43]).
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far more of the Japanese design guidelines are available to non-
Japanese speakers, with the comprehensive technical standards
being officially translated into English within a short time of
publication, as indicated in Fig. 2. Yamamoto and Fukute [67]
commented on the need to harmonise Japanese standards with
international standards. This has evidently been achieved as the
2007 Technical Standards are now consistent with ISO 21650 Ac-
tions from waves and currents on coastal structures as well as in-
ternational standards on reliability of structures and seismic ac-
tions for geotechnical works [51].
Interestingly whilst ISO 21650 contains descriptive information
about tsunamis (generally alongside information on storm surges),Fig. 13. Recently completed sea dikes defending Sendai airport just south of Yuriage
(b) details of the interlocking armour units on the offshore side of the structure.it does not provide any design methods or equations for de-
termining loads specifically due to tsunamis. According to the
Norwegian Geotechnical Institute [41] there was some discussion
about the inclusion of action from tsunamis, but at that time it was
deemed that there were insufficient research results available for
inclusion in the standard. It does recommend that the tsunami
characteristics are predicted based on past or numerical modelling
of potential future tsunamis. There is proposed provision for in-
clusion of basic tsunami considerations in the next revision of ISO/
CD 3010 (Basis for Design of Structures), though this primarily
pertains to onshore structures and so will not be addressed here.
Pilarczyk [56] makes mention of the fact that countries around
the world are developing their own standards in isolation, havingvillage, Natori City: (a) looking along the crest of the structure southwards; and
Fig. 14. Arahama sea dikes: (a) new portion under construction; (b) offshore side showing extent of construction site; (c) end of newly-completed portion south of the
construction site; (d) looking southwards along completed portion.
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the documents. Further international initiatives will have taken
place since this, especially around the Eurocodes (the set of har-
monised technical rules being implemented in Europe), though
waves attributable to seismic movement are not yet considered in
the Eurocodes [8].
The World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructure
or PIANC are a body of international experts on technical, eco-
nomic and environmental matters. Their Working Group 53 stu-
dies recommendations of maritime construction in areas prone to
tsunamis, with a view to disseminating information to port de-
signers and operators. Following the 2011 tsunami, PIANC pro-
duced a report based on the work that Japan's Port and Airport
Research Institute conducted which included detailed site surveys
and observations [54]. The closing section of the report discusses
new worst-case scenarios of tsunami sources and new approaches
to design of coastal defensive structures and coastal towns.
In the US, the design and construction of sea defence structures
is undertaken by the US Army Corps of Engineers who use the
internationally reputed Coastal Engineering Manual (CEM) [5] as
their technical guidance document. The manual is written by a
panel of experts under the auspices of the Coastal and Hydraulics
Laboratory. The CEM [5] pre-dates both the 2004 Boxing Day
tsunami and the 2011 Japanese event which may explain the lack
of reference to tsunamis, but it is still notable by its absence for a
country at significant risk from this threat [66]. The manual does
refer to a 1980 publication by Frederick Camfield of the US ArmyCorps of Engineers Coastal Engineering Research Centre [6] which
gives quite detailed design principles. Some of these principles
strike a chord with recent tsunami findings: the protective effect
of vegetation (citing research dating back to 1918); the position of
breakwater to avoid unwanted reflections; damage mechanisms
including scour; and the danger of receding water. However,
whilst there is good detail for onshore forces – for debris flow and
onshore structures – there is nothing on forces on coastal defen-
sive structures. The listed damage mechanisms focus mainly on
erosion and the only wave pressures presented are equivalent to
hydrostatic values i.e. there is no allowance for dynamic or impact
effects, which is not surprising given the understanding of im-
pulsive pressure at that time.
The US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have
produced guidelines for the design of vertical evacuation struc-
tures, i.e. buildings towards which a population would evacuate in
areas of low-lying ground and where the tsunami source is in close
proximity. The most recent revision, FEMA P-646 [20], includes
lessons learned from the 2011 tsunami; these are not discussed
here as they do not pertain to sea defences. The CEM and other
guidelines have no force of law; for legal requirements it is ne-
cessary to consider national codes and their referenced American
Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) standards. There are more than
60 ASCE standards covering all aspects of design, construction and
maintenance of civil engineering projects. Of relevance here is the
ASCE 7 Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures,
produced by the ASCE, which is currently being revised. A sub-
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Fig. 15. Main damage chain of gravity-based structures due to tsunami (translated from NILIM disaster scenario manual [43]).
A. Raby et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 14 (2015) 332–346342committee entitled Tsunami Loads and Effects is producing details
of tsunami loads on a range of structures for a new chapter. The
material is informed in part by a visit by the ASCE Structural En-
gineering Institute team that travelled to Japan after the 2011
tsunami to assess the performance of a range of structures [9]; the
subcommittee was coincidentally authorized about a month be-
fore the 2011 tsunami. This standard is due to be issued late 2015/
early 2016 and will be mandatory for states of Alaska, Washington,
Oregon, California and Hawaii. Several design maps for these re-
gions will be produced, including the probabilistic offshore tsu-
nami amplitudes based on the concept of a Maximum Considered
Tsunami, corresponding to a 2500 return period event. This design
basis event is used to provide inundation depths and flow velo-
cities for Tsunami Design Zone maps. It is understood that this
code will not explicitly contain information on the design of sea
defence structures though the proposed Section 6.7 does contain
comprehensive guidance on the prediction of tsunami amplitude,run-up and inundation, including such factors as coastal sub-
sidence. It also addresses detailed numerical modelling issues such
as model resolution and essential physics to be included e.g. re-
flected waves, channelling in bays and bore formation. Predictions
based on this guidance could form the basis of the design of
coastal defence structures in a tsunami-prone region.
5.2. UK design experience
In the UK there are different levels of regulation for designers of
sea defences. Firstly there are Acts of Parliament, supported in
some areas by Statutory Instruments. Providing more specific,
though not mandatory design guidelines, are the British Standards
(BS), some of which are codes of practise whilst others give spe-
cifications [22]. At a UK PIANC conference in 2014 [55] the revised
suite of BS6349 (Maritime works) were suggested to be close to
completion and perhaps forming the basis of a possible Eurocode
Fig. 16. Pair of photographs taken in the EEFIT missions across the port of Minamisanriku: (a) 2011 and (b) 2013.
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fically covers Marine or Coastal Structures, though there are
Eurocodes that have general applicability to coastal structures e.g.
EN 1991: (Eurocode 1) Actions on structures and EN 1997: (Euro-
code 7) Geotechnical design. A significant challenge of updating
BS6349 has been to ensure consistency with relevant European
harmonised standards [63]. Within BS 6349-1-1:2013 tsunamis
are mentioned in an appendix on metocean data acquisition and
are described as an example of infrequent condition, with a
warning that a short to medium-term data set might miss this
type of event.
Aside from these codes there are a number of guidance docu-
ments at the disposal of British coastal engineers, the most recent
of which are: The European Overtopping Manual [57] (currently
being revised), The Rock Manual [10], The Toe Structures Man-
agement Manual [4] and The Use of Concrete in Maritime En-
gineering: A Good Practise Guide [11]. Tsunami do not feature in
these publications; even the Toe Structures Management Manual
[4] which was published subsequent to the 2011 tsunami only
mentions them in connection with research undertaken by a Ja-
panese researcher [47] that related scour depth to overtopping.
That said, they do address the most important failure mechanism
identified following the Japanese 2011 tsunami i.e. toe scour. Other
European countries have similar situations in terms of using a
blend of European standards and local and international guidance.
In addition to design guidelines many European countries have
conducted hazard assessments. For example, as a result of the
2004 Boxing Day tsunami the UK government commissioned re-
ports to assess whether the country was at risk from tsunami
[13,14]. The first report had identified four potential source origins
and had produced initial model predictions of wave heights
around the coast. The subsequent report focused on two of those
source origins: the North Sea and a 1755 Lisbon-type event and
investigated the south-west and western Ireland regions in more
detail with estimations of wave heights and celerities. The worst-
affected areas (west Cornwall) might see an increased sea level of
4 m but a value of 2 m is more typical, both from the Lisbon-type
event. The lower water levels are comparable to storm surges
though the wave form and hence impact on the shoreline will be
different [48].
5.3. Design of sea defence structures for nuclear power facilities
Nuclear installations (power and non-power) had been subject
to Periodic Safety Reviews and have taken into consideration the
UK DEFRA tsunami studies [50]. Following the 2011 Japanesetsunami and particularly the effects of the nuclear disaster at Fu-
kushima Daiichi, the HM Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations
implemented reviews of all nuclear installations, reporting to the
Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change. This move was
closely followed in the European Council by the requirement for
“stress tests” of nuclear power stations to be undertaken; these
were to involve the investigation of “extreme natural events
challenging plant safety functions”. This was implemented by the
European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group. The process was ex-
tended in the UK to cover all licensed nuclear facilities [50]. Arising
from the HM Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations interim report
are a series of recommendations that include Interim Re-
commendation 10 (IR-10) that says:
“The UK nuclear industry should initiate a review of flooding
studies, including from tsunamis, in light of the Japanese experi-
ence, to confirm the design basis and margins for flooding at UK
nuclear sites, and whether there is a need to improve further site‐
specific flood risk assessments as part of the periodic safety review
programme, and for any new reactors. This should include sea‐
level protection.” [49]
In the Final Report from the HM Chief Inspector of Nuclear
Installations [48] it is recognised that since the DEFRA stu-
dies [13,14] there has been further research undertaken into tsu-
nami sources, such as potential submarine landslides further north
in the Arctic, into tsunami propagation (particularly in connection
with sea level rise) and into historic tsunami which may all lead to
revisions in water levels due to tsunami in the UK.
Nuclear power continues to be a major contributor to the UK's
energy mix with Europe's largest construction project, the d24.5bn
Hinkley Point C now under construction [21]. Built immediately to
the west of the Hinkley Point A and B stations in the Bristol
Channel, it will have a 900 m long seawall [15] of crest height
13.50 m Above Ordnance Datum (AOD) with an integrated foot-
path set at 12.40 m AOD as indicated in Fig. 17. The Hinkley Point C
Stress Test report as described by the ONR [50] (covered by the
non-power stress tests as it was at that time a future licensed site)
gives a flood height diagram, showing the extreme flooding level
of 9.52 m AOD (with no waves) and the site platform at 14 m AOD.
Taking into consideration “wave effects” of 2m this gives a margin
of 2.68 m for the site though a little less than 2 m before over-
topping of the wall would occur. This is deemed to be sufficient as
the site is a small distance inland of the seawall. Électricité de
France (eDF), who run the Hinkley power stations, commented
that natural hazards including all combinations of tides, storm
Fig. 17. Section through the proposed seawall at Hinkley C power station.
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have been taken into consideration [16]. eDF also commented that
the hazard return period is 1 in 10,000 years and a design life of 60
years has been used. In fact, the seawall at Hinkley Point C is by no
means dwarfed by the newly constructed 22 m wall that defends
the Hamoaka nuclear power station visited by EEFIT in 2013 [18],
despite the much greater tsunami inundation levels.
The Hamaoka nuclear power station is situated about 200 km
south-west of Tokyo. Fig. 18(a) is a photograph of the model of the
newly completed Hamoaka seawall that protects the facility (taken
in the Exhibition Centre at the power station since photography
was not permitted outside this area). It shows the various stages of
defence from the concrete armour units on the beach to the ve-
getated dike and finally the seawall, constructed from reinforced
concrete, steel cladding and a 70 mm layer of render (at prototype
scale). Fig. 18(b) shows how the design of the wall evolved from a
þ18m T.P. crest to a þ22 m T.P. crest with an additional section
and reinforcement; this crest level is now assumed sufficient to
prevent tsunami overtopping resulting from a Nankai Trough
Megaquake, the source of which is in close proximity to the power
station. However, in case the tsunami is of such a size that it
overtops the wall there are additional measures to prevent reactor
building flooding (e.g. additional walls, watertight doors) and to
ensure continued cooling function (e.g. back-up gas generator on
higher ground, additional water tanks). The Onagawa nuclearFig. 18. Hamaoka nuclear power station seawall: (a) Exhibition Centre model of the finapower station which lies closer to the epicentre of the 2011
earthquake than the Fukushima Daiichi plant has seawall crest
levels of 17 m though there are now plans for a super-seawall with
a crest level of 29 m, designed to withstand a 23 m tsunami. The
wall is being built immediately landward of the existing wall and
comprises a ‘steel pipe-type' construction of length 680 m. It is
due for completion by March 2016. These are examples of seawalls
that have been designed to withstand Level 2 events, for obvious
reasons.
In the report Foresight Reducing Risks of Future Disasters:
Priorities for Decision Makers [25] written for the UK Government
Office for Science the authors do not identify tsunami as con-
tributing to coastal flooding, listing only storms as the source
mechanisms. They also state that the UK approach is different
from that of the Japanese, being based on goal-setting “rather than
a purely deterministic, prescriptive, methodology”. According to
Day and Fearnley [12] permanent mitigation measures that in-
clude seawalls of a certain height are critically dependant on an
accurate determination of the extreme water levels. There is also
the danger that getting this estimation wrong inhibits responsive
mitigation e.g. warning systems, citing examples of people who
had evacuated to prescribed ‘safe' locations following the 2011 but
perishing due to inaccurate estimations. Had they used their in-
stincts and gone elsewhere they may have survived. Day and
Fearnley [12] call this a “brittle” mitigation strategy.l design and a (b) section through wall with recent modifications illustrated in grey.
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Japan's rich history of sea defence design has been enshrined in
standards and supplementary manuals. However the unexpected
size of the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami led to
the failure of a great number of sea defence structures including:
the brand new tsunami defence breakwater at the industrial port
of Kamaishi; the sea dikes defending the international airport at
Sendai; the 10 m seawall in Tarō (renowned for the performance
of its seawall in 1960); and most critically the seawall that pro-
tected the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station.
Lessons learned from these failures have been publicised in
research articles (both nationally and internationally), in new Ja-
panese engineering guidelines and manuals, and in revisions to
their standards. Work has been undertaken by NILIM (that sup-
ports MLIT), the Port and Airport Research Institute, international
bodies such as PIANC, researchers at many universities and by
reconnaissance mission teams from both inside and outside Japan.
There is evidence of cooperation between many of these organi-
sations e.g. the ASCE reconnaissance team was hosted by the Ja-
panese Society of Civil Engineers; Japanese academics have been
involved in developing the manuals and in publicising new ap-
proaches in international journals and at conferences; and in the
fact that one individual in NILIM is responsible for the revision of
standards and manuals for Japan. All this should lead to a con-
sistent body of material useful for the designer.
A key change in the design approach is the adoption of a two-
level description of tsunami hazard based upon return periods,
with sea defence structures being required to protect (e.g. prevent
overtopping) from the lower level hazard. However the structure
must merely remain intact in the event of a higher level as this
should still offer a degree of protection. Non-structural measures
would complement the sea defences for both levels of hazard.
One seminal document, the NILIM disaster scenario manual
[43], is comprehensive in its description of the effects of tsunamis
on a range of sea defence structures. This material enables the
designer to appreciate the possible failure mechanisms. New re-
commendations in the standards and manuals include: the use of
geotextile membranes in sea dikes to avoid leaching of infill ma-
terial; reinforcement of sea dike toes on the landward side;
widening of breakwater rubble mounds; and interlinkage/re-
inforcement of concrete blocks in seawalls.
The EEFIT return mission in 2013 provided opportunities to
visit newly-completed sea defences. Considerable progress on re-
placement sea dikes at two locations along the coastal plains was
observed, though seawalls at Minamisanriku remained untouched
as the population had now moved inland. There was evidently
progress on the repair of the Kamaishi breakwater and contacts at
PARI indicated there was agreement to rebuild the Tarō seawall.
Material available to designers of sea defence structures in
other tsunami-prone areas has been considered, though there
appears to be a paucity of such information. This is understandable
in some regions where less developed countries face competing
pressures for limited financial resources, but it is notable that this
threat is not addressed in design codes for at-risk European
countries (despite a risk and precedent of large tsunamis in the
region). In this region there needs to be more joined-up thinking
between those who understand the tsunami sources and the im-
plications for populations and infrastructure. In the US there will
shortly be the revised ASCE 7 standard, a significant resource for
designers, but this material stops short of explicit guidance for the
design of tsunami-resistant sea defences.
Shock waves that reverberated around the nuclear industry
following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear catastrophe are forcing
designers to consider these risks but outside of Japan, design
guidance seems to be lacking. It is essential that the findingsresulting from the tragic events of March 2011 are disseminated as
widely as possible, both to inform industrialised nations and those
that rely on international codes.Acknowledgements
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